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President Johnson has pledged that the executive branch "will be administered
with the utmost thrift and frugality; that the Government will get a dollar's value for
a dollar spent; and that the Government will set an example of prudence and
economy.'
Heads of departments and agencies, responding to this pledge, are undertaking
affirmative action to carry out this request-including the initiation of cost reduction
programs, the de-emphasis of cost-type contracting, and the re-emphasis of fixed-price
and incentive-type contracting. Accordingly, there is occasion to examine carefully
the experience of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) with regard to economy in
contracting, and particularly in regard to the use of various forms and methods of
contracting.
In evaluating various forms and methods of contracting, there must be considered
the whole "system" of contracting used by the agency and indeed the organization
and functions of the agency as a whole. What is desirable for one type of system
may not work well for another; similarly, one form of contract may work well
for one type of function or operation but may not work very well for another.
In very broad terms, the AEC is responsible for a program of manufacturing
fissionable material and atomic weapons; developing nuclear propulsion systems
for naval vessels; conducting research and development aimed at improved weapons,
more efficient production, generation of useful power from atomic energy, utilization
of radioactive material for medical, biological, and health purposes; and regulating
the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Thirteen Field Offices carry out the atomic
energy program under the general direction and supervision of the AEC Head-
quarters office.
Most AEC work is accomplished by contractors. There are more than X35,000
persons working directly in the program, of which approximately 7,000 are AEC
employees. The rest work for our contractors. At present, the AEC investment in
plant, equipment, and real estate is approximately eight billion dollars, and operating
costs are at an annual level of approximately $2.7 billion. These government-owned
facilities are managed and operated for the AEC by contractors. Our operating
contractors comprise a variety of industrial, academic, and not-for-profit organiza-
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tions. Thus, for example, our Savannah River plutonium production plant down
at Augusta, Georgia, is operated by DuPont. Oak Ridge is operated by Carbide.
Our two weapons laboratories at Los Alamos, New Mexico and Livermore, California
are, interestingly enough, operated by the University of California, and so on. Clearly
the core of the AEC method of operation is by means of contracts.
The atomic energy enterprise is largely owned by the people of the United States,
and its operation is directed toward the paramount objective of assuring the common
defense and security and, beyond that, toward obtaining for the people the many
constructive benefits that atomic energy offers. Congress intended that the Commis-
sion continue the Manhattan Engineer District's practice of contracting with in-
dustrial concerns and academic institutions to perform the actual operations of
AEC-owned plants and laboratories. Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act,
this course is explicitly permitted. The unanimous report of the Senate Special
Committee on Atomic Energy that drafted the original act stated:'
Wherever possible, the committee endeavors to reconcile Government monopoly of the
production of fissionable material with our traditional free enterprise system. Thus, the
bill permits management contracts for the operation of Government-owned plants so as to
gain the full advantage of the skill and experience of American industry.
While the operation of AEC plants and laboratories comprises the core of our con-
tracting program, the Commission's overall contracting activities include a large
number of contracts and subcontracts for research and development and testing in
private industrial and university facilities. AEC also annually expends two to three
hundred million for construction and modification of facilities which are handled by
various types of construction contracts and subcontracts.
USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
To carry out its responsibilities for the operations of its plants and laboratories,
the AEC adopted the "administrative" or "management" contract,3 which in part
was a carry-over of a contracting concept from the Manhattan Engineer District of
World War II days. This form of contracting represented the development of a
working relationship between government and industry. While it had been used in
various situations, as far as I know it was not previously used extensively in govern-
ment contracting programs with industry.
Under this contracting concept, the government-industry/university relationship
is sometimes characterized as a partnership or cooperative arrangement.4 In short,
under the "administrative" or "management" contract, the AEC is responsible for
"what" is to be done and the contractor for "how." That is, the AEC retains the
responsibility for overall program management and direction including the develop-
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ment or approval of long range program plans; establishment of basic policies and
program objectives; budget and cost ceilings; and audit and evaluation of program
execution and performance. On the other hand, the contractor is responsible for
the day-to-day management to carry out the work.
The AEC "administrative" or "management" contract is cost-type and includes
provisions giving the government the right to exercise appropriate control over the
work consistent with the "partnership" nature of the arrangement.
In line with this relationship there are several contract provisions which spe-
cifically reserve to the government the right to control the work and to assure a
judicious expenditure of government funds. For example:
i. Provisions for AEC to approve program objectives.
2. Approval of subcontract actions-generally over $io,ooo.
3. Approval of salaries over $25,ooo and assurance that other wage and salary
and employee benefits are reasonable and consistent with commercial practices.
4. Establishment of procurement, financial and accounting systems consistent with
government requirements.
The degree of actual supervision or control over the contractor will vary with the
experience and capability of the contractors. The contract is so designed to provide
for this kind of flexibility. AEC is organized under a decentralized contract admin-
istration system. The field offices, which are located at the site of the work, are
generally organized to provide counterparts to the operating contractor's managerial,
technical and administrative staff. Both AEC and contractor staffs, as a result of
the continuity peculiar to AEC's programs, have accumulated above normal experi-
ence and training.
AEC personnel are in a position to maintain close liaison with contractor per-
sonnel having operational and other management responsibilities for the company
and to exercise such supervision and control over the manner and methods of opera-
tion as may be necessary or desirable to insure that program objectives and schedules
established by AEC are met and that expenditures made by the contractor from
public funds are made in accordance with the provisions of the contract which reflect
applicable legal and AEC policy requirements. These AEC staff functions include
examination and evaluation of managerial actions, operations and nonroutine
maintenance functions; frequent observations of the activities being conducted in the
plants and facilities; and daily contact with the contractor personnel on operational
and management problems generally.
In addition to the routine conferences for resolving the many day-to-day op-
erating problems, AEC also has a program of formal review and evaluation of con-
txactors. Under the program, AEC appraises the adequacy of the contractor's man-
agement activities; cost of services rendered; achievement of program objectives; and
compliance with applicable laws, regulations and AEC instructions. Any question-
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able conditions or practices are brought to the attention of the contractors' manage-
ment and appropriate remedial action is taken.
Although there are many similarities between the usual cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) contract and AEC's administrative or management contracts, there are some
fundamental differences. AEC's CPFF operating contracts are not conceived of as
involving a seller and a buyer and a specialized method of arriving at a price for the
thing sold or service provided. On the contrary, our operating contracts seek to
establish long-term working relationships more akin to those between a board of
directors and a manager, or between a home office and a branch office. These
contracts, in the nuclear materials and weapons production sphere, are conceived of as
management arrangements rather than contracts for product. Similarly, our con-
tracts for the operation of laboratory facilities are not viewed as contracts for research
so much as contracts for the management of research facilities. So conceived, the
contracts are drawn and administered in a fashion designed to promote a close, co-
operative relationship between the parties. This relationship facilitates the re-
sponsiveness of individual contractors to changes in the direction, scope, and in-
tensity of their efforts, which might be necessary in order better to fit the particular
contractor's current activities into overall AEC programs.
The differences between traditional concepts of the CPFF contract and the AEC's
operating contracts are emphasized because these differences provide the key to
understanding why the Commission continues to believe that in the context of our
own activities these arrangements are generally best suited to the successful accom-
plishment of the programs in which they are employed at the lowest possible cost.
A fundamental similarity among all CPFF contracts, including AEC's operating
contracts, must be conceded, however. None of them offer a profit motivation for
reducing costs.
Notwithstanding the lack of a profit motive to reduce costs, it has been AEC's
experience to date that significant cost reductions can be "administered" into its
operating contracts. The reasons for this are twofold: first, because AEC, in the
main, has responsible and experienced contractors who have no incentive to raise
costs, and are responsive to efforts to lower costs; and secondly, because of the
unusual fashion in which AEC is set up to administer and exercise the rights of
direction and control as provided in its administrative contracts.
It may be argued that no matter how skillfully and extensively a CPFF contract
is administered, there is no real substitute for the profit motive. Conceding this
point, arguendo, the CPFF contract provides a substantial incentive for high
quality performance for the very reason that the profit motivation to reduce costs
is absent. By the same token, there is no incentive to cut corners on safety-a matter
of the utmost significance to the AEC. These last two factors are regarded as amply
offsetting any theoretical difference in cost , performance pursuant to a profit incentive.,
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COST REDUCTION PROGRAMS WITHIN AEC
One of the more successful efforts to achieve cost reductions resulted from AEC's
early efforts to stimulate competition between its contractors. Indicative of these
early efforts is a report dated June 8, 1953 from the Chairman of the AEC to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which reads in part:5
In the past, competition within the program has been limited because the major activities
were concentrated in single facilities where contractors had only their own past perform-
ance against which to compete. With the expansion programs of the past and forth-
coming few years, new facilities are being constructed for production of U-235, plutonium
and weapons. There will thus for the first time be an opportunity for healthy rivalry in
plutonium production between such contractors as General Electric and duPont, and in
production of U-235 between Goodyear and Carbide. While there will be many disparate
factors to be taken into account in comparing performance of these firms, the presence of
rivals will, we are confident, do much to stimulate aggressive improvement of manage-
ment.
Another key factor has been the AEC's cost accounting system. Since 1953 AEC
Field Offices have continuously used product cost data to measure and evaluate the
progress of contractors engaged in production activities. In turn, this information
has been used by contractors in determining cost trends and in evaluating their own
efficiency. To assist contractors to better perform these functions, Field Offices have
set up Production Cost Comparison Committees composed of AEC and contractor
accounting and technical representatives. These committees have met periodically
at different contractors' plants to study the production operations at first hand and
to analyze and compare product costs and highlight less efficient operations. This
effort has contributed to significant savings.
A knowledge of comparative costs for the same or similar products produced by
two or more plants has enabled management to develop production schedules for
such plants at the least cost to the AEC. Contractors have made extensive use of
product cost data in the preparation of production budgets. Field Offices also use
these data in evaluating the contractors' estimates. Both Field Office and Head-
quarters staff use product cost data as the basis for making decisions regarding
revisions of the original budget estimates. At Headquarters, a knowledge of unit
product costs has been an effective tool in the overall planning and scheduling of
production requirements. Not surprisingly, the trend in unit cost of all principal
AEC products has been downward throughout the past ten years.
As to be expected in the comparatively new and young nuclear industry, many
of the reductions have resulted from technical improvements in production methods
and processes. For example, the dramatic success achieved in process development
and cascade improvement resulted in reduction of the wartime peak operating
personnel strength at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant from about i,ooo to
around 5,000 by 1958. With further developments in instrumentation and control
systems this number has been reduced to the present level of roughly 2,6oo. Other
' (Unpublished.)
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reductions have also been attributed to improved management-planning, scheduling,
and utilization of available capacity-and to economies in costs of operations. The
competition among contractors has been a most significant factor, even without the
profit motive. The desire to perform better and at lower cost than one's competitor
is seemingly a natural instinct.
Current AEC cost reduction efforts include development of specific guidelines for
contractor cost reduction programs. The purposes of these guidelines are:
I. To encourage individual contractors to intensify their efforts in achieving cost
reductions in the performance of government contracts.
2. To establish the minimum criteria for an effective government contractor cost
reduction program as related to government business.
3. To provide for qualitative review by the government of the individual con-
tractor cost reduction policies, systems, and procedures to make possible the
application of the policies and criteria stated above.
A further step to give additional impetus to the program includes communications
with selected AEC contractors requesting assistance in achieving significant further
cost reductions and apprising them that field managers will call on them to discuss
the importance of cost reduction actions and to establish a system of periodic reporting
of pertinent actions taken. In 1963, estimated savings from cost reduction actions in
AEC exceeded $95 million, and this is expected to rise to over $150 million in 1964.
CosT-PLus-FIXED-FEE CoNTRACTs
As a part of their cost reduction program, some agencies are strongly pushing the
use of fixed-price and cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts in lieu of cost-plus-
fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts. For example, Department of Defense (DOD) represent-
atives have stated that savings' of twenty-five per cent and ten per cent respectively
are effected by the use of such contracts instead of the use of CPFF contracts.
In considering the reduction of DOD's use of the CPFF contracting technique,
it is important to keep in mind that DOD's principal contracting activities relate
to the procurement of weapons systems and components and are more oriented to
the buyer-seller relationship while AEC's contractors are engaged to manage our
plants and laboratories. The continuity maintained by AEC programs further
facilitates the conception of AEC's operating contractor arrangement as not so much
a specialized method for arriving at the price for a product sold or a service provided.
Rather, these administrative or management contracts are drawn and administered
in a fashion designed to promote a close cooperative relationship between the
parties.
In summary, AEC's present position is that its operating contracts provide the
best means for accomplishing the programs for which they are used at the least
'Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic, Committee, 88th
Cong., Ist SesS. 29, 36 (x963).
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cost, but this position does not rest entirely on their peculiar suitability for these
programs. In part this view continues to be held because AEC takes a somewhat
less enthusiastic view of the advantages of the available alternative contracting
techniques than does the Department of Defense or the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).
Possible alternatives to AEC's CPFF operating contracts are some form of
fixed price or unit price arrangement, with or without features such as escalation
provisions or price redetermination provisions, or the CPIF contract. The potential
fluctuations in production goals (for special nuclear material and weapons) seem
clearly to eliminate the fixed or unit price contract. After much study AEC
concluded that with such features as price redetermination, they are not suitable
for the operation of production facilities-without reaching other possible problems
with this type of contract for this purpose. So far as AEC's laboratory operations
are concerned, there is little if any activity reasonably susceptible of fixed pricing.
What is left as a practical matter is the incentive fee contract.
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
The incentive fee contracting technique is ingeniously attractive. It is a cost-type
contract; but, instead of a fixed fee, the contract is set up so that the amount of fee
will vary depending upon the contractor's performance as measured against a pre-
established goal or "target." Targets are established for cost performance or technical
performance or delivery performance, or combinations of the three, depending upon
the particular contractual circumstances.
Assuming a simple case where the fee fluctuated only with cost performance,
there would be a profit incentive to reduce costs and at the same time the protections
against windfall profits and losses afforded by the CPFF contract would seem to be
present. The term "seem to be present" seems appropriate because the effectiveness
of the entire scheme hinges on the degree of certainty attaching to the cost target.
The greater the accuracy with which the target can be established, the better the
arrangement works.
However'-and here is the rub-if the target can be established with a degree
of accuracy that avoids windfall profits and losses, the question arises: Why cannot
a fixed or unit price arrangement be employed rather than a cost-type arrangement?
While the writer does not know the answer to that question, he suspects that it
lies in the proposition that a cost estimate can be of such a degree of certainty as
to warrant establishment of a target for CPIF purposes while at the same time not
being certain enough for fixed price purposes. How many cases fall in this
category? From the use of this contracting technique by the DOD and NASA, they
probably encounter quite a few. Although the Commission is looking for them, not
many have been yet encountered in the AEC.
Application of the CPIF contracting technique to AEC's operating production
contract situations has been examined carefully. The fact that the plants are wholly
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government-owned introduces significant complications into an already complex
arrangement. For example, with the facilities being owned by AEC a most careful
check would have to be maintained to assure that underruns of cost targets were
not achieved by skimping on plant maintenance.
Despite a number of potential problems, the potential advantages of appropriate
use of the CPIF technique in AEC operations are such that we are trying one out.
The present contract with General Electric for the operation of the AEC's pro-
duction plant at Pinellas Peninsula, St. Petersburg, Florida is the contract involved.
Under this arrangement, the contractor's fee is increased or decreased within pre-
scribed limits, as certain costs exceed or are less than the target costs estimated and
agreed to by the AEC and the contractor. While it is too early to evaluate the
results of the arrangement, AEC officials directly associated with the project are
enthusiastic about the results indicated to date.
Additionally, as something of an experiment, AEC entered into a research and
development incentive arrangement with Aerojet-General Corp., Azusa, California,
and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Large, Pennsylvania, its subcontractor for
the NERVA nuclear rocket project. In this case, the nature of the research and
development effort did not lend itself to a conventional incentive approach of
increase or decrease in fee based on specific goals for performance, time for comple-
tion, or cost; and the incentive fee is based on a broad base of performance reports
and overall performance evaluation. The actual fee paid, within prescribed limits,
is based on a unilateral determination by the government as to the contractor's
performance. No reportable results are available at this time on this "incentive
award" arrangement, although it does not appear to have wrought any miracles.
FIXED-PRIcE CONTRACNG
The question of fixed-price versus cost-type contracting in the numerous con-
tracting situations outside of the context of the contracts for the operation of AEC-
owned plants and laboratories has been of considerable concern to AEC. While it
is firm AEC policy to use fixed-price contracts wherever possible, AEC has had
some unfortunate experiences where eagerness and enthusiasm for fixed-price con-
tracting resulted in inappropriate use of these forms of contracts.
In one case, after award of a fixed-price contract covering pipe for one of our
large reactor projects, it turned out that a cost-type contract would-have been a more
suitable arrangement because of the additional research and development which was
necessary to get acceptable pipe. Even though there had been extensive pre-award
inquiry of pipe manufacturers concerning -capacity- and capability to produce the
particular type pipe needed, it developed dujring the course of the work that the
production process known to the trade had to be further developed and the neces-
sary change orders could have been handled much easier and more appropriately
under a cost-type contract.
' AEC Procurement Regulations § 9-3.404-3(a)(1), 41 C.F.R. § 9-3.404-3(a)(i) (1962).
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In another instance AEC was faced with an inability to deliver acceptable com-
ponents for a large accelerator at one of our laboratories. Notwithstanding that a
contract for research and development covering the feasibility of building these key
components had been made in advance of the award of the fixed-price contract
covering production, problems arose concerning production methods and tolerances;
and it developed that necessary changes and modifications to the contract required
to accomplish the work could have been handled much better under a cost-type
contract. In summary, AEC's most difficult problems with fixed-price contracting
have developed in the procurement of items where some of the components were
"first-of-their-kind," involving rigid specifications, close tolerances and high per-
formance requirements.
Experiences such as this, plus a tendency to carry over to those more conventional
contract situations the intensive administration applied to CPFF operating contracts,
cause AEC to continue to feel that the CPFF contract, judiciously employed, can
still play a vital role in selected situations in addition to the operating contractor
situation.
Nevertheless, the writer strongly agrees on the general advantages of fixed-
price contracting. AEC has had some very successful experiences, particularly in
the procurement of cores for atomic propulsion of submarine and surface vessels in
our Naval Reactor Program. As an example of the cost reductions that have been
obtained in the Naval Reactor Program through competitive fixed-price contracting,
AEC's experience in procurement of submarine reactor cores should be cited. These
cores which can be considered as the heart of nuclear power plants are procured
for the Navy by the AEC.
The price now paid for submarine cores is about one-third the amount AEC
paid for the original cores we purchased. Although this significant reduction in price
can be partially attributed to experience and to increased production, undoubtedly
the method of contracting used-fixed-price competitive bidding-by providing core
manufacturers with strong incentives to develop improved manufacturing processes
and reduce production costs in other ways as well, played a significant part in the
marked reduction in prices. Moreover, advances in core technology have at the
same time increased the lifetime of naval reactor cores by a factor of three or more
so that the cost of these cores per unit of energy produced has been reduced by about
a factor of ten during a period of ten years.
The cost-type "management" contract, as utilized by the AEC for operation of
its own production and research and development facilities, has proved to be a very
useful tool. There are also a number of circumstances where the usual cost-type
contract can be appropriately employed. We in AEC will continue to prefer the
use of fixed-price contracts; but we will continue to guard against their improper
use.
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SUMMARY
The Atomic Energy Commission has devised an almost unique contracting tech-
nique to cover the operation of its government-owned plants and multi-program
laboratories. This contracting technique, while nominally straight cost-type con-
tracting, is in fact somewhat apart from the normal conception of a CPFF contract.
The departure from the norm stems initially from the fact that the contractual
arrangements are regarded as basically calling for the management of facilities
rather than as being simply very complex ways of buying something.
The departure is augmented and implemented by specific contractual provisions
providing broad rights of AEC control; and yet, in the interests of maximum opera-
tional flexibility, reserving exercise of this control to a tailor-made contract admin-
istration set-up. The combination of broad controls and extensive administration
working in a carefully created atmosphere of cooperation serves to offset, to a degree
not normally present in CPFF arrangements, the criticism that no profit incentive for
cost reduction is present. Substantial alternative means for cost reductions are
present, have produced positive results, and, under the spur of current all-out cost
reduction programs, are continuing to do so. Moreover, the AEC's operating con-
tracts, in emphasizing technical excellence and safety to an above-normal extent,
appear better suited to their particular applications than other contract forms.
With particular reference to the use of the incentive contracting method, the current
view of the AEC is a cautious approach stemming from a more conservative regard
for the benefits of this contracting method than seems to be held by DOD and
NASA. Similarly, AEC continues to believe that, properly used, the CPFF con-
tracting technique has a significant role also in conventional (i.e., non-operating)
contract situations.
